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18 November 1961 25X1




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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
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*Dominican Republic: [] President Balaguer told the American consul general Hill yesterday that all efforts to persuade Generals Hector and Arismendi Trujillo to go abroad again had failed. []


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[Earlier yesterday Balaguer had told Hill he was now convinced that Hector and Arismendi had returned on 15 November by prearranged plan with Ramfis, and that the three of them were motivated primarily by a desire to protect the family's extensive economic interests in the country. Balaguer urged that maximum US pressure he brought to bear on Hector and Arismendi, including the imposition of additional economic sanctions and the threat to use armed force. Balaguer, who had considered his own resignation after the return of Hector and Arismendi, indicated that he now is inclined to stay on, let Ramfis leave, and then attempt to maintain himself against the two brothers.]

[The Trujillos and those dependent on them probably believe they have several advantages in bargaining with Balaguer and the US. They are exploiting Balaguer's fear that the military will either seize the government or start fighting among themselves in the absence of a Trujillo to command their loyalty. They have also been exaggerating the influence of pro-Communists, and in fact have been encouraging and abetting pro-Communist and pro-Castro activities, in order to create the fear of an extremist take-over.]

[Word of Ramfis' impending departure began to reach the public on 17 November, and, in the prevailing climate of unrest heightened by growing strikes, there is danger of serious rioting in the capital and other cities. Leaders of the moderate opposition are attempting to cause the strikes to snowball into a general nationwide work stoppage.]

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[Laos: The Boun Oum government has accepted Souvanna's suggestion for a meeting of the three princes in Vientiane beginning 24 November, and the Pathet Lao radio has broadcast

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Souphannouvong's endorsement. Despite the breakthrough in this political impasse, a solution to the problem of apportioning cabinet posts among the three factions in a coalition government will require concessions by all sides. 25X1

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USSR-Finland: Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov informed the Finnish ambassador that Kekkonen's actions in dissolving parliament and calling for new elections did not satisfy the Soviet requirements and that a "qualified" Finnish delegation was still expected to come to Moscow. Although Kuznetsov did not insist that military officials be included in the delegation, the Soviets apparently are seeking formal consultations under the 1948 mutual assistance treaty as proposed in the 30 October Soviet note. In addition to political guarantees and a pro-Soviet stand on the alleged threat from West Germany, the Soviets may press for some specific Finnish action in the military sphere, such as acceptance of additional Soviet armaments. (Backup, Page 2) 25X1

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Communist China - Bloc: Communist China has sharpened its challenge to the Khrushchev leadership by publishing on 17

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November the full text of Hoxha's 7 November speech which referred to the Soviet leader in such abusive terms as anti-Marxist, revisionist, and "a horned devil." While making unmistakably clear their support of the Albanian leaders, the Chinese are printing the charges of both sides. The Chinese press has not yet offered any editorial comment of its own.

The Soviet Union, by publishing a speech by Togliatti on 10 November in the 16 November Pravda, has made explicit to the Soviet public the extent of Chinese Communist involvement with Albania and the fact that the Soviet attack on Albania involves the larger issue of Soviet-Chinese relations. Ignoring Togliatti's criticism of Soviet handling of de-Stalinization, Pravda has printed the passages in Togliatti's speech which note that the Albanians are supported in part by the Chinese and that Chou En-lai was "unjustified" in criticizing Khrushchev's open condemnation of Albania. Although the Soviet and Chinese leaders may continue to rely on the words of others to express their positions, these tactics do not hide the seriousness of Soviet-Chinese disagreement. [REDACTED] (Backup, Page 5)

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France-Algeria: Ben Bella's hunger strike now has become a major obstacle to an Algerian settlement. It is doubtful that the provisional Algerian government could agree to formal negotiations with France unless Ben Bella ends the strike or is released from French custody. [REDACTED]

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
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[The Ben Bella impasse is also creating problems in Morocco. Opposition elements are criticizing the government for its failure thus far to obtain the release of Ben Bella. Ambassador Bonsal in Rabat considers that disturbances in Morocco are "very possible" within the next few days in the absence of some favorable and dramatic development in Paris.]

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USSR: Moscow, apparently fearing a recurrence of the riots which took place in Georgia following the condemnation of Stalin at the 1956 party congress, is proceeding with great caution in implementing new de-Stalinization measures in Stalin's native republic. The Georgians were permitted to accord Stalin traditional honors at the 7 November celebrations in Tbilisi; his statues were decorated with flowers, and pictures of him were prominently displayed. As yet there has been no move to rename the various towns and streets in the republic named for him. The first real test of the Georgians' reaction will come when local party meetings are held in the republic on the results of the 22nd party congress. Such meetings are already taking place throughout most of the Soviet Union.

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Finland Under Increasing Pressure From USSR

Soviet insistence on beginning consultations on the threat of German militarism in the Baltic indicates that one of Moscow's ultimate aims may be to extract a Finnish commitment to sign a peace treaty with East Germany.

In the military aspects of the consultations, Moscow is likely to use the pretext of a threat from Bonn to criticize Finland's present air-defense system as inadequate and may insist that Helsinki accept further Soviet military assistance --possibly early-warning radar and MIG jet fighters. During Soviet-Finnish military aid talks in mid-1960, Moscow reportedly offered MIG-17s or MIG-19s, but the Finnish delegation declined and asked for MIG-21s, which the Soviet officials refused. The Finnish delegation apparently also expressed an interest in acquiring surface-to-air guided missiles, a request which Moscow at that time refused to discuss. Finnish defense officials indicated after the talks that they intended to renew the request at a later date. Since the USSR has subsequently agreed to provide guided missiles to at least three underdeveloped countries, it may offer such weapons to Finland as well.

[redacted]
[redacted] Helsinki's major purchases have been [redacted] non-combatant jet light bombers, [redacted] medium tanks, and relatively small amounts of infantry weapons. Moscow now may insist that Helsinki utilize the remainder of the arms credit to finance air-defense purchases.

The US Embassy sees a further blow to Finnish morale resulting from the 16 November statement by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov that the USSR is not satisfied with President Kekkonen's call for new elections in February as being a sufficient guarantee of Finland's continued neutrality. In light of these developments, the Finns may now feel that they can no longer delay a formal reply to the Soviet note of 30 October. The embassy notes that in view of their well-known distrust of free elections, the Soviets may feel Kekkonen has not moved far or fast enough to meet their demand for political guarantees.

Finnish public opinion apparently is convinced that because of the lack of a defensible border and the inadequate military establishment, there can be no repetition of the resistance which occurred in similar circumstances during the winter war of 1939-1940. Furthermore, President Kekkonen, the only figure around whom the country can rally during the present crisis, has thus far made no conciliatory gestures toward the non-Communist opposition parties and has, in effect, rebuffed their appeal for national unity as being based on 'old memories and instincts.' Faced with this unyielding attitude and the prospect of heightened tension in Finnish-Soviet relations, the opposition parties reportedly may either withdraw their support from Kekkonen's principal rival in the 15 January presidential elections or persuade their candidate to withdraw on his own volition.

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 Military Representative of the President
 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 The Scientific Adviser to the President
 The Director of the Budget
 The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
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